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Elvis Is Alive, But He Shouldn't Be: 
The Right of Publicity Revisited 
Lee Goldman* 
The right of publicity protects against the unauthorized 
commercial appropriation of a person's name, likeness, 
performance or identity. The most common invocation of this 
right occurs when a third party appropriates a celebrity's name 
or likeness for endorsement purposes, for the sale of 
memorabilia, or in connection with artistic or literary works.' 
Celebrity plaintiffs also may raise the right when their style or 
performance has been imitated or reproduced.' 
In today's marketplace, use of a celebrity's name or 
likeness may generate millions of dollars in revenue. Disputes 
about entitlements to that revenue take many forms. The 
* Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. 
1. See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enter. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 
1991) (Elvis memorabilia); Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(Babe Ruth calendar); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (Ginger and 
Fred movie); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 
1983) ("Here's Johnny" portable toilets coupled with phrase "the World's Foremost 
Commodian"); Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980) (Elvis statues); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 
579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) (Elvis posters); 
McFarland v. E & K Corp., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1246 (D. Mim. 1991) ("Spanky" 
name and likeness in advertising for "Spanky's Saloon" and on clothing sold); 
Brockum Co. v. Blaylock, 729 F. Supp. 438 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (Rolling Stones T- 
shirts); Marcinkus v. NAL Publishing Inc., 522 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1987) 
(Vatican official depicted in fictional work); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social 
Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982) (Martin 
Luther King, Jr. statues); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979) 
(Count Dracula memorabilia). 
2. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) 
("human cannonball" act shown in its entirety during news program); Groucho 
Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night, Inc., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982) (musical play 
. A Day in HollywoodlA Night in the Ukraine used the Marx Brothers' style); Estate 
of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (Elvis impersonator 
presented "The Big El Show"). 
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National Hockey League suffered a strike, in part, because of a 
dispute concerning the distribution of revenues from player 
trading cards.3 USA Basketball, the governing body for the 
United States Olympic Basketball team, threatened to remove 
Michael Jordan from its squad when his assignment to Nike of 
exclusive rights to his likeness prevented USA Basketball from 
distributing group shots of the American team on T-shirts and 
other articles of   lo thing.^ Bette Midler successfully sued Ford 
Motor Company when, in its advertising, Ford used a sound- 
alike to perform a song Ms. Midler had made famous.5 
Questions about the scope of the right of publicity, its 
descendibility and its interaction with First Amendment and 
copyright interests have been the subject of numerous 
commentaries and judicial decisions? No writer, however, has 
questioned the doctrine itself. This article undertakes that task 
and concludes that the right of publicity should be abolished. 
Any interest furthered by the right of publicity is more 
appropriately protected by state unfair competition law or 
section 43 of the Lanham the tort of misappr~priation,~ 
3. See F'ilip Bondy, Hockey: It Isn't Dollars, the Players Maintain, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 6, 1992, at C5; Tony Kornheiser, Commentary: For Sheer Myopia, Take a 
Look a t  the NHL, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, at  C9. 
4. Jack McCallum, Olympic-Sized Squabble, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 23, 
1992, a t  71. 
5. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); see also infra note 
114. 
6. See infkz notes 27-32. ' 
7. 15 U.S.C. $ 1125(a) (1988). Section 43(a) embodies a federal unfair 
competition and deceptive trade practices law. The section prohibits false or 
misleading descriptions or representations of fact. An essential element of a section 
43(a) claim is a likelihood of confusion concerning sponsorship, origin or a person's 
association with goods or services. 
8. The misappropriation tort derives from the Supreme Court decision in 
International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 US. 215 (1918). The basic 
elements of the claim are that (1) plaintiff expended substantial effort to create the 
"thing" appropriated; (2) the defendant took and made commercial use of the 
plaintiffs asset with little cost or effort; and (3) the defendant's taking injured the 
plaintiff and potentially eliminated an incentive for others to create the type of 
"thing" appropriated. Id. at  240-41. See also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS 
AM) UNFAIR COMPET~ION $ 10:25, at  396 (2d ed. 1984). In INS, the defendant 
news service took "hot news" stories from early editions of East Coast newspapers 
that subscribed to Associated Press, rewrote the stories and used them in INS 
newspapers on the West Coast. ORen the INS papers would print the stories 
before publication in competing Associated Press subscribing papers. The Supreme 
Court approved the lower court's injunction prohibiting INS from using Associated 
Press's public dispatches so long as the dispatches remained "hot news." 248 US. 
a t  245 -46. 
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and possibly the right of privacy.' 
Part I1 of this article provides a brief historical discussion 
of the derivation and development of the right of publicity. Part  
I11 discusses the rationales suggested by courts and 
commentators to justify the right of publicity. Part IV argues 
that the right of publicity is not merely superfluous, but 
harmful. Recognition of a right of publicity conflicts with free 
market, First Amendment and copyright interests. Finally, part 
V concludes that, absent confusion or misappropriation of a 
celebrity's performance, there is no valid reason to protect the 
commercial value of a celebrity's name or likeness. 
11. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
The right of publicity evolved from Samuel Warren's and 
Louis Brandeis's classic law review article on the right of 
privacy.1° Warren and Brandeis argued that the law should 
secure to all a "right to be let alone."" Their emphasis was 
upon the embarrassing disclosure of private facts.12 The first 
judicial decision to adopt their proposed right of privacy, 
however, involved the commercial appropriation of an  
individual's name and likeness. 
In 1905, Paulo Pavesich alleged that a newspaper 
advertisement falsely identifying him, with picture and 
testimonial, as a thankful holder of life insurance, constituted 
an invasion of privacy and a libel. Although the lower court 
dismissed Pavesich's complaint for failure to state a claim, the 
Georgia Supreme Court reversed.13 Pavesich v. New England 
Life Insurance Co., like most of the early appropriation cases 
that followed, fits squarely within the Warren and Brandeis 
conception of privacy." Although alleging a misappropriation 
of identity, plaintiff was a private citizen seeking damages for 
"wounded feelings."15 The emphasis was upon the invasion of 
9. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
10. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890). 
11. Id. at 193. 
12. Id. at 196, 215-16. Dean Prosser has suggested that Warren and Brandeis 
were motivated by the perceived prying, unfair press treatment of the social affairs 
of Samuel Warren and his proper Bostonian family. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 
CAL. L. REV. 383, 423 (1960). 
13. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
14. Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the 
Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603, 621 (1984). 
15. 50 S.E. at 73. 
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personal autonomy or integrity, not the loss of a commercial 
opportunity. l6 
Born a t  a time when celebrity status generally was not 
perceived as a commodity capable of wide exploitation, it was 
perfectly reasonable to view misappropriation of identity as a 
type of privacy tort." However, as society became captivated 
by motion picture, television, and sports personalities, the 
characterization of the misappropriation tort as an  invasion of 
privacy appeared problematic. Given widespread media 
coverage of celebrities, courts could not see how the celebrity 
plaintiff could suffer mental distress or wounded feelings from 
additional publicity. Indeed, for many celebrities, such publicity 
was a boon. Therefore, when a plaintiff whose identity was 
already well known alleged an infringement of his privacy 
interest, courts often found the celebrity to have waived his 
privacy right.'' 
Celebrities wanting to capitalize on the commercial value 
of their fame needed a new theory. Judge Frank, writing for 
the Second Circuit in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps 
Chewing Gum, inc.,lg was the first to accommodate their 
need. In Haelan, the court enjoined a baseball card company's 
unauthorized use of player photographs, holding that, in 
addition to and independent of a right of privacy, the players 
had an  exclusive "right of publicity" in the pecuniary value of 
their l ikenes~es?~ Damages for this action did not depend on 
any injury to feelings. Rather, plaintiffs' claims were for the 
financial rewards from the commercial use of their notoriety. 
16. Id. at 80. "The tort of improper appropriation is thus perceived as an outer 
bulwark for the protection of self." Richard A. Epstein, A Taste for Privacy?: 
Evolution and the Emergence of a Naturalistic Ethic, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 665, 669 
(1980). 
17. See Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of 
the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1205 (1986). Dean 
Prosser, in his widely influential article on privacy, reviewed the decisional law 
and concluded that the right of privacy did not protect against a single wrong, but 
four distinct types of injury: "(1) [ijntrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or 
solitude, or into his private affairs[;] (2) [pbblic disclosure of embarrassing private 
fads  about the plaintiffl;] (3) [plublicity which places the plaintiff in a false light 
in the public eye[; and] (4) [alppropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the 
plaintiffs name or likeness." Prosser, supra note 12, at  389. I t  was the fourth 
category that emerged as the right of publicity. 
18. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 203, 204-06 (1954). 
19. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). 
20. Id. at 868. 
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
Following Haelan, several jurisdictions similarly created this 
new right through statute or judicial de~ision.~' 
Widespread recognition of a right of publicity did not occur, 
however, until after the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in 
Zucchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting CO.~' In Zucchini, 
the defendant videotaped the plaintiffs "human cannonball" act 
in its entirety and showed it during defendant's television news 
program. The Court's opinion cited with approval the case law 
recognizing a right of publicitf3 and provided two widely 
repeated rationales for protection of that right: (1) providing an 
economic incentive, analogous to  patents and copyrights, for 
the investment required to produce performances of interest to 
the and (2) "preventing unjust enrichment by the 
theft of good The Court then reinstated the plaintiffs 
claim for damages (which the lower court had denied), rejecting 
the defendant's First Amendment defense.26 
Following Zacchini, most courts and commentators 
accepted the existence of a right of publicity and only concerned 
themselves with its s~ope.~' Litigation and commentary have 
focused on whether there is a postmortem right of publi~ity;~ 
21. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. $ 540.08 (West 1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 214, $ 3A (West 1973); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966); Hogan v. 
A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314, 320 (Pa. C.P. 1957). 
22. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
23. Id. at 572. 
24. Id. at 573, 576. 
25. Id. at 576. 
26. The Court reasoned, in part, that the plaintiff was not trying "to enjoin the 
broadcast of his act; he simply sought compensation for the broadcast." Id. at 573- 
74. The Court also emphasized that the defendant did not merely report a 
newsworthy fact, but broadcast the plaintiff's entire act. The First Amendment 
could not immunize that appropriation any more than it could privilege the 
defendant to broadcast a copyrighted work without payment to the copyright 
owner. Id. a t  574-75. 
27. As of 1991, the right of publicity is explicitly recognized, by common law or 
statute, in 24 states. See J. THOMAS MCCAWTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND 
PRTVACY $ 6.1[B], at 6-6 (1992). No state explicitly rejects the right of publicity. Id. 
28. See, e.g., Groucho Mam Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night, Inc., 689 F.2d 317 (2d 
Cir. 1982); Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Nature's Way Prods., Inc. v. Nature-Pharma, Inc., 736 
F. Supp. 245, 251-53 (D. Utah 1990); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 
(Cal. 1979); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American 
Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982); Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. 
Rubin, The Descendibility of t h ~  Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After 
Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125 (1980); Halpern, supra riote 17, a t  1215-38; Roberta R. 
Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 191, 207-28 (1983). 
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whether the right extends beyond name and likeness to  voice 
and other aspects of if and when the state right is 
preempted by federal copyright law:' and the appropriate 
contours of the First Amendment defense to the right of 
publi~ity.~' Despite years of litigation and commentary, 
confusion remains .32 
The following sections of this article question the 
rationales underlying the right of publicity and suggest that 
countervailing considerations far outweigh any interests 
protected by the publicity right. The policy implications of this 
conclusion are several. Congress should contemplate federal 
legislation preempting the right of publicity. Courts and 
legislators that have not addressed the right of publicity should 
reject such a right. Legislators that have adopted a right of 
publicity should consider its repeal. At a minimum, courts 
attempting to determine the scope of the right of publicity 
should interpret the right as narrowly as possible. They should 
decline to protect aspects of identity beyond name and likeness, 
reject a postmortem right of publicity and expansively define 
First Amendment and copyright interests. 
- - -- - - 
29. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Carson v. 
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983); Sinatra v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 
906 (1971); Kwall, supra note 28, a t  204-06; Christopher Pesce, The Likeness 
Monster: Should the Right of Publicity Protect Against Imitation?, 65 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 782, 797-805 (1990). 
30. See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 
805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987); Sinatra v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 
906 (1971); Pesce, supra note 29, at 809-20; David E. Shipley, Publicity Never Dies; 
I t  Just Fades Away: The Right of Publicity and Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL . 
REV. 673, 686-737 (1981). 
31. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989); Benavidez v. 
Anheuser Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1989); New Kids on the Block v. 
News Am. Publishing, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540 (C.D. Cal. 1990), afld, 971 F.2d 302 
(9th Cir. 1992); Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., Inc., 737 F. Supp. 826 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1015 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. 1986); Randall T.E. Coyne, Toward a Modified Fair Use Defense in Right of 
Publicity Cases, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 781, 812-20 (1988); Steven J. Hoffman, 
Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. COPYRTGHT SOCV 111, 139-45 
(1980); Kwall, supra note 28, a t  229-53; Pesce, supra note 29, a t  806-09. 
32. See Pesce, supra note 29, a t  783; Gary M. Ropski & Diane L. Marschang, 
The Stars' Wars: Names, Pictures and hokalikes, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 8 1  (1989). 
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
111. EVALUATION OF THE RATIONALES FOR THE 
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
The three rationales most often cited as justifying a broad 
right of publicity are (1) allowing persons to reap the full 
commercial value of their talents creates incentives that benefit 
society; (2) protecting a person's interest in his or her name, 
likeness or identity furthers personal autonomy and integrity; 
and (3) prohibiting appropriation of the commercial value of 
another's identity or personality prevents unjust e n r i ~ h m e n t . ~ ~  
Despite the superficial appeal of these rationales, they do not 
withstand closer analysis. 
A. The Incentives Rationale 
As explained by the Supreme Court in Zucchini, the incen- 
tives rationale posits that the right of publicity "provides an 
economic incentive for [individuals] to make the investment 
required to produce a performance of interest to the 
This is the same rationale underlying the patent and copyright 
laws.35 
In the vast majority of publicity cases, however, it is un- 
necessary to protect the commercial value of a celebrity's name 
or likeness to encourage the activity that makes the individual 
famous.36 Many celebrities are motivated by concerns other 
than money. Actors love to act; sports stars enjoy the competi- 
tion. Even for the more mercenary, the rewards of the primary 
activity are often so great that additional incentives are super- 
f l uo~s .~ '  True, not all performers are well compensated for 
33. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 
(1977); MCCARTHY, supra note 27, $8 2.1-2.2, at 2-1 to 2-12; Coyne, supra note 31, 
a t  786; Hoffman, supra note 31, at  116; Kwall, supra note 28, at  197-99; Shipley, 
supra note 30, at  681-82; J. Eugene Salomon, Jr., Note, The Right of Publicity Run 
Riot: The Case for a Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1185, 1189 (1987); 
Alisa M. Weisman, Note, Publicity as  an  Aspect of Privacy and Personal Autonomy, 
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 727, 730, 737 (1982). 
34. Zucchini, 433 U.S. at  576. 
35. Id. 
36. Fame or celebrity is not a requirement for a right of publicity claim. Never- 
theless, the incentive rationale generally has little application outside the celebrity 
context. 
37. In economic terms, the celebrity oRen operates at  an inelastic portion of 
their supply curve. Given the alternatives available, a change in the rewards of 
celebrity will not decrease the number of persons seeking stardom. 
Professor McCarthy suggests that a right of publicity is necessary to encourage 
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their talents. Many gifted artists find commercial success elu- 
sive. The likelihood of additional compensation from collateral 
sources, however, varies inversely with need.38 It  is the Madon- 
nas and Michael Jordans who reap the greatest rewards from 
the right of publicity, not the struggling actor or author. More- 
over, eliminating the right of publicity would not remove all 
collateral sources of celebrity revenue. Businesses using a 
celebrity's name or likeness would still be subject to state un- 
fair competition law and the Lanham Act prohibition against 
misrepresentat i~n.~~ Celebrities, therefore, would still receive 
licensing income for the right to distribute "official" products as 
well as endorsement income from publicly associating with a 
company's goods or services.40 
Not only is the right of publicity unnecessary to encourage 
creativity, it also may be undesirable. The public may enjoy the 
collateral uses of a celebrity's identity more than it appreciates 
the talents that gave rise to the celebrity's fame. If so, increas- 
ing the collateral benefits from celebrity status through the 
right of publicity may lead to over-investment in the primary 
a~t ivi ty .~ '  This raises the related normative question: Do we 
want a society in which fame has economic value apart from 
the activity that creates celebrity? Are the Olympics the same 
individuals who fear the "crass commercialization" of his or her name to undertake 
enriching activities that may lead to social prominence. MCCARTHY, supra note 27, 
5 2.2, at  2-10. Although Professor McCarthy labels this concern an incentive justifi- 
cation for the right of publicity, it seems more appropriately categorized as a per- 
sonal autonomy argument. The personal autonomy rationale for the right of publici- 
ty is discussed in detail below. See infia notes 47-58 and accompanying text. 
Briefly, if the First Amendment protected media coverage of the prospective celebri- 
ty does not dissuade him or her from undertaking the desired activity, it seems 
doubtful that the possible commercialization of his or her name and likeness will 
have that effect. This is especially true if the public knows that the individual has 
not authorized and does not profit from the commercialization. 
38. See Hoffman, supra note 31, at  120. 
39. See supra note 7. 
40. Admittedly, however, the celebrity's income would be reduced. No longer 
would a company have to pay a license fee for uses of the celebrity's name or 
likeness that were accompanied by a clear and conspicuous disclaimer. The celebri- 
ty would also lose revenue when the context made it clear that the celebrity nei- 
ther endorsed nor was associated with the product sold. For example, parodies 
would likely be immune from suit without recourse to the First Amendment. Few 
people would think that Richard Nixon endorsed the poster of a pregnant woman 
that had the caption "Nixon's the one." 
41. Cf Rochelle C. Dreyhss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in 
the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 408 (1990). If the supply curve 
for the primary adivity is perfedly inelastic, however, over-investment would not 
occur. 
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if athletes compete only for the economic rewards that fame 
may bring? Do we really want sports figures to make them- 
selves controversial so that their heightened name recognition 
can increase their collateral revenues?42 Recognizing a right of 
publicity may also distort competition in the market for collat- 
eral goods. For example, the most artistic or highest quality 
producers of T-shirts may not prevail in the marketplace if they 
do not get the support of the "hot" celebrity.43 
The popularity of the incentives rationale derives from the 
Supreme Court's language in and the analogy to 
patent and copyright law. The rationale's popularity, however, 
is misplaced. Zucchini involved the appropriation of the 
plaintiffs performance, his "stock in trade." In performance 
cases, similar to patent and copyright, it is the plaintiff's pri- 
mary activity that is being protected. Consequently, incentives 
are beneficial and do not distort competition in secondary mar- 
kets. This is not true of most publicity cases. Even in appropri- 
ation of performance cases, a right of publicity is not required. 
The Copyright Act will protect most celebrities' performances, 
and the tort of misappropriation4' or common law copyright46 
can provide protection in the few performance cases outside the 
scope of the federal Act. In short, although the incentives 
rationale is the most oft-cited policy supporting the right of 
publicity, it is also the weakest. The creation of collateral in- 
centives for celebrity through a right of publicity is unnecessary 
and often may be economically and socially undesirable. 
B. The Personal Autonomy Rationale 
Several commentators have suggested that the celebrity's 
interest in personal autonomy and liberty justifies a broad 
right of publicity." The use by others of the commercial value 
42. Recently, some entrepreneurs have produced mass murderer trading cards. 
If the families of the villains portrayed have a right of publicity claim, the poten- 
tial consequences are mind-boggling. 
43. Theoretically, the best T-shirt maker should still triumph, but with higher 
costs. That is, the most efficient manufacturer should bid the highest for the li- 
censing rights. However, in the real world, with transaction costs, including strate- 
gic bargaining, theory and practice often do not coincide. 
44. 433 US .  at 573, 576. 
45. See supra note 8. To prevent misappropriation from swallowing whole the 
right of publicity, the tort should be limited to situations in which the defendant 
injures the plaintiffs primary activity or "stock in trade." See International News 
Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 US. 215, 236 (1918). 
46. See MCCARTHY, supra note 27, 5 8.13, at 8-92 to 8-94. 
47. See, e.g., Denicola, supra note 14, at 625; Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Prop- 
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of the celebrity's name or likeness "affects the very essence of 
the individual. Whether or not to exploit this value is a deci- 
sion that shapes and modifies the scope of one's personality 
and one's image.''48 The individual's interest in maintaining 
control over his or her persona is most compelling when others 
use the celebrity's associational value in offensive ways. For 
example, a vegetarian may experience a great loss of personal 
autonomy if his or her persona is used to sell beef. I t  is this 
personal autonomy interest that distinguishes the right of pub- 
licity from other intangible property rights. 
There is no question that the celebrity's image may be 
damaged through association with disreputable products. Such 
associations may limit future endorsement opportunities or 
even impede professional de~eloprnent .~~ Unrestricted use of 
the celebrity's name and likeness also may harm the celebrity's 
reputation by creating the perception that the celebrity is moti- 
vated solely by greed. Both effects, however, can be remedied 
through state unfair competition law or section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act." Absent a likelihood of confusion as to source, 
the celebrity's image and reputation, a t  most, should be only 
marginally affected. If the public is aware that the celebrity 
neither endorsed a product nor profited from the use of his or 
her name, the public's perception of the celebrity should remain 
unchanged. It is doubtful, for example, that many people 
thought less of Johnny Carson merely because a portable toilet 
company made unauthorized use of a slogan associated with 
Mr. Ca r~on .~ '  I t  is a person's personality, his interactions with 
others, and perhaps, the media coverage he engenders, not non- 
confusing uses of his name or likeness, that define or affect 
"the very essence" of the individual. 
The notion that the individual should have absolute control 
over the use of his or her identity is quaint, but n a i v e a t  least 
for the celebrity plaintiff. Because the First Amendment pro- 
tects most articles about public figures,52 the famous have lit- 
erty Rights, and Misrepresentations, 12 GA. L. REV. 455, 460-61 (1978); Salomon, 
supm note 33, at 1189; Weisman, supra note 33, at 730. 
48. Salomon, supm note 33, at 1189. 
49. See Kwall, supra note 28, at 199. 
50. See supra note 7 .  
51. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 
1983) (maker of "Here's Johnny Portable Toiletn advertised product as "World's 
Foremost Commodian"). 
52. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also infia notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
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tle control over the most embarrassing presentations of their 
name and likeness. For example, a quick perusal of the super- 
market tabloids and fan magazines suggests that the media 
coverage of celebrities is intense and often negative. If Burt 
Reynolds's personal identity can survive questionable stories 
about his alleged homose~ual i ty ,~~ it is unlikely that it will 
suffer by the sale of a calendar with his picture accompanying 
one of the months. 
Admittedly, a celebrity may feel frustrated if his name or 
likeness is used to further sales of a product or service he affir- 
matively dislikes. Absent confusion or misrepresentation:* 
however, most such uses of a celebrity's identity would have an 
expressive element worthy of First Amendment protection. I n  
any event, it is unlikely that a celebrity often would face the 
indignity of non-confusing, offensive uses of his persona. Most 
businesses would fear that the annoyed celebrity would public- 
ly respond with a negative endorsement. For example, Reebok 
will probably not advertise that their sneakers let you fly like 
Michael Jordan because Mr. Jordan might respond by telling 
the press that he has tried Reebok, but much prefers Nike. 
Similarly the vegetarian celebrity might respond to a beef asso- 
ciation campaign using his or her name by speaking out 
against the health risks of eating red meat. 
Finally, the personal autonomy rationale cannot justify the 
scope of the right of publicity recognized by many courts. Ab- 
sent some further rationale, there should be neither a postmor- 
tem right of publicity nor a right of publicity for groups.55 The 
damages resulting from an assault on personal autonomy are 
to feelings, as in traditional privacy actions. The law does not 
recognize a postmortem right of privacys6 since the privacy in- 
terest in one's liberty and feelings dies with the individual. 
53. False tabloid stories may be actionable under defamation laws. New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), however, requires the public figure 
plaintiff to demonstrate actual malice to prevail. The difficulty of proof and atten- 
dant expense under that standard deter many celebrities from bringing such ac- 
tions. 
54. Of course, if there was a likelihood of confusion or misrepresentation, a 
state unfair competition or federal Lanham Act claim would lie. See supra note 7. 
55. For a list of courts and legislatures that have recognized a postmortem 
right of publicity, see MCCARTHY, supra note 27, § 9.5, at  9-31 to 9-40. Courts 
recognizing a right of publicity for groups include Brockum Co. v. Blaylock, 729 F. 
Supp. 438, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1990), and Bi-Rite Enters. v. Button Master, 555 F. 
Supp. 1188, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
56. See MCCARTHY, supra note 27, 8 9.1, a t  9-2. 
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There is no reason personal autonomy should support a greater 
entitlement in right of publicity actions. 
Recognition of a right of publicity in groups introduces a 
similar incongruity. Groups cannot have a personal autonomy 
interest. To state the obvious, a group is not a person. Al- 
though individual members of the group have a personal auton- 
omy interest derived from portrayals of the group, it is a weak 
interest. By its very nature, group membership requires relin- 
quishment of exclusive control of decision making which, in 
turn, lessens the personal autonomy-and thus the interest in 
personal autonomy-of the group's members. In short, recogni- 
tion of a postmortem right of publicity and extension of the 
right to groups suggests that the personal autonomy rationale 
cannot be the primary justification supporting the right of 
publicity. 
To summarize, the personal autonomy interest, born in 
privacy law, protects feelings, not the commercial value of the 
plaintiffs name or likeness.57 This interest may justify a pri- 
vacy suit by private individuals, but should not support relief 
for the ~elebrity.~' Unlike private citizens, celebrities arguably 
have waived certain rights to privacy, are routinely subject to 
media scrutiny protected by the First Amendment, and often 
can effectively respond to public misrepresentations. Absent 
confusion, then, the celebrity's asserted personal autonomy 
interest is more rhetoric than reality. 
C. The Unjust Enrichment Rationale 
A final rationale for the right of publicity is "the straight- 
forward one of preventing unjust enr i~hment . "~~ "[Aln intu- 
ition of fairness, a norm often linked to natural rights,"60 and 
57. Nonetheless, a court may choose to award damages corresponding to the 
commercial value of the celebrity's persona. By removing the "unjust enrichment" 
from the defendant, the commercial value damages more effectively deter the mis- 
appropriation. Also, it may be easier to determine a market value for the 
celebrity's persona than it is to estimate the injury to the celebrity's feelings. 
58. The celebrity should be denied even injunctive relief. A contrary rule only 
would encourage strategic bargaining by the celebrity. Given the commercial value 
of the celebrity's persona, the celebrity could threaten to seek an injunction unless 
the defendant paid for the use of the celebrity's name or likeness. The result 
would be similar to  that which exists under current law. 
59. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977). 
60. See MCCARTHY, supra note 27, $ 2.1[A], at 2-2; Wendy J. Gordon, On Own- 
ing Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 149, 156 (1992). 
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a respect for the property rights of individuals underlie this 
rationale? Plaintiffs should be entitled to the fruits of their 
labor and defendants should not be allowed to "reap where 
another has sown.'s2 As explained by the Supreme Court, 
" 'No social purpose is served by having the defendant get free 
some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and 
for which he would normally pay.' '"' 
This argument assumes the answer to the question under 
consideration. There is no unjust enrichment unless the law 
recognizes a right of publicity in the plaintiff and defines the 
defendant's taking of that right as wrongful.64 Whether the 
law should consider the defendant's appropriation a misappro- 
priation demands a balancing of interests. The "fruits of their 
labor" and "$hould not reap where another has sown" mantras 
merely trivialize the required analysis. 
The notion that a person should not reap where he or she 
has not sown, or free ride on the creativity of others, admitted- 
ly has intuitive appeal. Taken literally, however, it is drastical- 
ly overbr~ad .~~  Our culture permits many forms of fkee-rid- 
ing?"ven though all professional golfers owe a figurative 
debt to Arnold Palmer for popularizing the sport and thereby 
increasing the revenues available to them, Arnold Palmer is 
not entitled to a commission from every other professional 
golfer's income. Computer software companies might not have a 
market if IBM did not develop computer hardware; still, IBM is 
not entitled to  royalties from those companies' software sales. 
In the analogous field of trademark law, courts specifically 
61. See MCCARTHY, supra note 27, $ 2.1[A], at 2-1 to 2-3; Kwall, supra note 28, 
at 198. 
62. See MCCARTHY, supra note 27, $ 2.1[A], at 2-1 to 2-3; Gordon, supra note 
60, at 156; Kwall, supra note 28, at  198. 
63. Zucchini, 433 U.S. at  576 (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort 
Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 
(1966)). 
64. Cf. James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, ~ikenesses,' and 
Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV. 637, 643 (1973) ("The assertion that a celebrity 
has lost a fee when an advertiser appropriates his name or likeness without con- 
sent states a bare conclusion. He has lost a fee only if other advertisers would be 
willing to pay it, which in turn depends on whether the law requires the pay- 
ment ."). 
65. See Gordon, supra note 60, at 167. 
66. According to Professor Gordon, "A culture could not exist if all free riding 
were prohibited within it. Every person's education involves a form of free riding 
on his predecessors' efforts, as does every form of scholarship and scientific prog- 
ress." Id. 
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have ruled that one can capitalize on a market or fad created 
by another provided there is no confusion.67 Often even the 
celebrity plaintiff free rides on the efforts of others. Media 
coverage may increase the celebrity's popularity and revenues, 
yet the celebrity does not have to pay a fee for such attention. 
In short, we live in an age of economic and social interdepen- 
dence. Free-riding, standing alone, is not wrongful or unjust? 
Free-riding primarily is troublesome when it places the 
originator a t  a competitive disadvantage because he incurs 
development costs that the free rider avoids. In such cases, 
allowing a party to "reap where another has sown" can discour- 
age desired creative a~tivity.~' This is not the situation in the 
typical right of publicity case.70 The "free rider" does not com- 
pete in the celebrity's primary market." In the secondary 
market, e.g., the market for memorabilia, the activity that 
brought fame to the celebrity plaintiff generally will cover any 
expenses that the free rider evades.72 Indeed, the celebrity 
plaintiff will be at a competitive advantage vis-a-vis another 
competitor in the market for collateral goods. The celebrity will 
be able to advertise his or her goods as "official" and publicly 
endorse the sale of those goods. State unfair competition laws 
67. See, e.g., International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 
F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); American Footware 
Corp. v. Universal Footware Co., 609 F.2d 655, 662 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
445 U.S. 951 (1980); Bi-Rite Enters. v. Button Master, 555 F.Supp. 1188, 1195 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). But see Boston Prof. Hockey Ass7n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 
Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). 
68. Cf. National Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 
@. Del. 1977) (holding that the NFL had no legal right to  prevent the state lot- 
tery from using the popularity of NFL football to further lottery sales). 
69. Cf. United States Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., 749 F.2d 1028, 1038-41 
(3d Cir. 1984) (rejecting misappropriation claim on the basis that in the absence of 
direct competition, defendant's use would not interfere with desired incentives). 
70. The free rider may place entertainers at a competitive disadvantage in 
appropriation of performance cases. Those cases, however, can be handled by mis- 
appropriation actions. See supra note 8. 
71. Free riders also might discourage useful activity if their actions injure the 
originator's primary market. This can be true even if the free rider does not com- 
pete in the primary market. For example, if the free rider damages the celebrity's 
reputation, the celebrity may lose revenues from, and the incentive to participate 
in, the primary market. For a discussion of these possible harms, see infra notes 
79-82 and accompanying text. 
72. It might be argued that licensees incur costs that the free rider escapes. If 
there were no right of publicity, however, all h ture  licensees only would pay a fee 
that corresponded to  the benefit they received from the right to sell "official" goods. 
The licensees would not operate a t  a competitive disadvantage unless they negoti- 
ated improvident contracts. 
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and the federal Lanham Act prohibit the "free rider" from 
matching that activity.73 Frequently, the only reason the "free 
rider" reaps rewards is because he or she adds value un- 
matched by others. He or she may have more creative T-shirt 
patches, better quality clothing or more clever advertising. In  
these cases, even labeling the competitor a "free rider" may be 
inappropriate. 
Just  as the reaplsow principle undervalues defendants' 
contributions and interests, the natural rightslfruits-of-one's- , 
labor argument overstates plaintiffs' entitlement to the com- 
mercial value of their identity. A natural right to the fruits of 
one's labor has not been recognized. For example, creative writ- 
ings and inventions must be protected by statutes and that 
protection extends only for a limited time.74 When Congress 
enacted copyright legislation, the House Report specifically 
stated that the legislation was "'not based upon any natural 
right that the author has in his writings. . . but upon the 
ground that the welfare of the public will be sewed and prog- 
ress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to 
authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their 
 writing^.'"^^ If creative artists are not entitled to all direct 
rewards from their labor, celebrities surely do not have a right 
to all collateral benefits from their celebrity. A natural right to 
one's publicity value seems especially doubtful given that the 
right of publicity was not even recognized until this cen t~ ry . ' ~  
One might even question whether the commercial value of 
a celebrity's identity should be regarded as  the fruits of the 
celebrity's labor. Fame frequently is fortuitous. I t  always de- 
pends on public participation and often hinges on sympathetic, 
or a t  least extensive, media coverage.77 Although the 
celebrity's talents are at least partially responsible for the 
celebrity's notoriety, those talents are compensated by revenues 
from the celebrity's primary market. If the public believes that 
73. See supra note 7. 
74. See 35 U.S.C. $ 154 (1988) (patent protection expires after 17 years); 17 
U.S.C. $ 302(a) (1988) (copyright recognized during author's life and for 50 years 
thereafter). 
75. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 580 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 
(1909)); see also Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 446 
(S.D. Ohio 1980), affd in part & rev'd in part, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982). 
76. See supra notes 10-26 and accompanying text. 
77. See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). 
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the celebrity is entitled to still greater returns, it can always 
choose to pay the premium for "official" celebrity sponsored 
goods. 
Even if celebrities do not have a "natural right" to all the 
fruits of their labor, simple fairness and incentive concerns 
might demand that the law deem an appropriation of the com- 
mercial value of a celebrity's persona unjust if it injures the 
celebrity's primary activity. Two principal injuries may result 
from another's use of a celebrity's persona in a secondary mar- 
ket: (1) association with disreputable products or false sugges- 
tions of endorsement may diminish the public's perception of 
the celebrity; and (2) overexposure of the celebrity's persona 
may create a public backlash that reduces the demand for the 
celebrity's primary activity. 
As suggested earlier,78 the first type of harm will be ac- 
companied by confusion of source or misrepresentations that 
are actionable under state unfair competition law or the 
Lanham Act. Therefore, a right of publicity is not necessary to 
protect the celebrity from this harm. The second type of injury 
may exist even in the absence of confusion or misrepresenta- 
tion. The injury to the celebrity would be analogous to dilution 
of trademark.7g Market saturation might tarnish the 
celebrity's image. Again, however, the injury is more apparent 
than real. Much of the harm from overexposure derives from 
the public's perception that the celebrity is motivated solely by 
greed. Such a perception, however, should not exist in the ab- 
sence of confusion of source. In any event, the greatest overex- 
posure results from media coverage protected by the First 
Amendment, not from the sale of celebrity products or services. 
Accordingly, a right of publicity would not affect that source of 
overexposure. 
There is also a real question whether saturation in the 
market for collateral goods causes lasting harm to the 
celebrity's primary ac t i~ i ty .~ '  Madonna's and Michael 
Jackson's media coverage is exhaustive (and exhausting); the 
78. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
79. Dilution law prohibits the unauthorized, non-confusing, but frequently of- 
fensive use of another's trademark when the result is a weakening or tarnishment 
of that trademark. 
80. Overexposure may reduce the celebrity's sale of secondary goods. That 
harm, however, is consistent with free market competition. Preserving the 
celebrity's market for collateral goods is not necessary to preserve desired incen- 
tives. See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text. 
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marketplace is filled with their memorabilia. Nevertheless, 
their concerts always sell out. Moreover, even in the trademark 
field, the dilution theory is far from universally accepted?' 
The federal government has rejected enactment of an anti-dilu- 
tion law.82 Given that the primary source of the celebrity's 
overexposure is the First Amendment protected media, there is 
even less reason to adopt a dilution theory in the right of pub- 
licity context. Thus, although the law is rightly concerned 
about maintaining incentives for creativity in primary markets, 
it  is not necessary to define the appropriation of a celebrity's 
commercial value in collateral markets as unjust to preserve 
those incentives. 
Finally, the unjust enrichment rationale also fails because 
i t  compares the rights of the plaintiff with those of the defen- 
dant rather than with the public's interests." It is the public 
that ultimately pays if celebrities are accorded a n  exclusive 
right to all commercial value of their name and likeness. The 
public must suffer the higher prices and reduced output associ- 
ated with monopoly as well as face possible infringement on 
First Amendment interests.84 
In summary, unjust enrichment does not stand as an  inde- 
pendent justification for the right of publicity. In an  era of 
interdependence, free riders cannot be eliminated and individu- 
als do not have a right to all the fruits of their labor. The real 
question, then, is where the line demarcating celebrities' enti- 
tlement should be drawn. I have argued that incentive and 
fairness concerns support drawing that line at the celebrity's 
primary activity. Given public interests, and the absence of. 
some other compelling rationale, celebrities' entitlement should 
not be extended beyond that  point. 
IV. COUNTERVAILING INTERESTS AGAINST THE 
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
Our economic system favors free and open competition 
81. See David S .  Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. 
REV. 531 (1991). 
82. See id. at 537. 
83. Professor Gordon warns: "Against an articulate plaintiff who is enunciating 
what sounds like a moral interest in reaping what she has sown often stands a 
commercially motivated defendant who may be an unsympathetic figure poorly 
situated to communicate what the community has at stake." Gordon, supra note 
60, at 279. 
84. See infia notes 86-112 and accompanying text. 
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unless monopoly control would enhance overall competition or 
further some other social goal.85 The previous section chal- 
lenged the policy arguments for granting an individual monopo- 
ly control over his or her identity. The following sections dis- 
cuss affirmative countervailing interests that strengthen the 
case against adoption or continuation of a right of publicity. 
A. The Effect of the Right of Publicity on Competition 
The right of publicity encumbers free enterprise and com- 
petition by granting the individual monopoly control over the 
commercial value of his or her persona. As with all other mo- 
nopolies, this grant of monopoly power has distributive and 
efficiency effects. 
The obvious distributive effect is that purchasers pay a 
higher price for celebrity memorabilia. The celebrity, often 
already well-compensated, reaps relatively more of the gains 
from trade with consumers than would be the case in a more 
competitive market. Although many economists are not con- 
cerned with distributive effects, it is difficult to ignore the dis- 
tributive consequences of a doctrine so often justified by con- 
cepts of fairness and equity?' 
Apart from the distributive effect, the right of publicity 
generates a less than optimal allocation of resources. The mo- 
nopolist must create an artificial scarcity of supply to generate 
higher prices. Consequently, consumers who value the 
monopolist's product more than the marginal cost of its produc- 
tion, but less than the inflated market price, do not purchase 
the product." Consumer wants that could efficiently be ful- 
filled go unsatisfied. 
One commentator has questioned whether permitting the 
celebrity's persona to enter the public domain would actually 
increase competition and allocative efficiency? He suggests 
that  the relevant market may not be memorabilia that bears a 
85. See F.T.C. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169, 2176-77 (1992); Morales 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2056 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 US. 679, 695 (1978); 
Hoffman, supra note 31, at 122. 
86. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text. 
87. See Denicola, supra note 14, at  633. 
88. See Kevin S. Marks, Comment, An Assessment of the Copyright Model in 
Right of Publicity Cases, 70 CAL. L. REV. 786, 803 (1982); cf. Denicola, supra note 
14, at 634-35 (making a similar argument in the context of institutional trade- 
marks). 
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particular celebrity's likeness, but instead the market for all 
pop-hero merchandise. The consumer then would enjoy the 
benefits of competition between different celebrity's products. 
For example, if Michael Jordan posters became too expensive, 
the consumer instead could purchase a Magic Johnson poster. 
Undeniably, there is some competition among each 
celebrity's memorabilia. Nevertheless, it is easy to overstate the 
degree of competition. For many, only a given celebrity's mer- 
chandise will do. Ringo may substitute for George, but not for 
Paul or John. No one may substitute for Elvis. Geographic and 
temporal factors further militate in favor of defining the mar- 
ket as each individual celebrity's pop merchandise. Little com- 
petition exists for a given celebrity's products at concert tour 
sites, other special locations (like Graceland), or immediately 
following the celebrity's death. This is significant because there 
is evidence that the majority of entertainers' revenues from col- 
lateral sources derive from concert, as opposed to retail, 
sales." 
Theoretical market definitions aside, it is clear that the 
marketplace for celebrity merchandise is not competitive. In  a 
perfectly competitive market, price is equal to the seller's mar- 
ginal cost. The marginal cost of celebrity endorsements, howev- 
er, effectively is zero. Once the celebrity has achieved fame, 
there is no additional commitment of resources necessary to 
supply a n  additional user with the right to use the celebrity's 
name or likene~s.~' Thus, license fees in a perfectly competi- 
tive market should approach zero. That is far from the case in 
the real world. Millions, if not billions, of dollars are paid in 
license fees. As suggested earlier, license fees were, in large 
part, the cause of a National Hockey League strike as well as  
the dispute between Michael Jordan and USA BasketbalLsl It 
is those license fees that contribute to the dislocation of re- 
sources and redistribution of wealth. 
Finally, even if celebrities were not interested in raising 
prices through output restriction, some dislocation of resources 
would result. Some celebrities choose not to license any prod- 
ucts or engage in strategic bargaining that produces the same 
89. See Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1207 (N.D. Ill. 
1981), affd, 830 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987). 
90. Cf. Denicola, supra note 14, at 634-35 (making a similar point for institu- 
tional trademarks). 
91. See supra notes 3-4. 
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result. Demand for their product goes unmet. If, absent confu- 
sion, a celebrity's name or likeness were considered public 
domain material, that demand would be satisfied. 
The economic arguments may be interesting, but a simple 
equation has the greatest persuasive value: the right of publici- 
ty = higher license fees = higher costs = higher prices = reduced 
demand.92 State unfair competition laws and the federal 
Lanham Act will prevent complete elimination of license fees. 
There are many situations, however, where non-confusing use 
is made of a celebrity's persona. Abolishing the right of publici- 
ty would result in lower or no license fees in such cases. 
B. Free Expression and the Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity often conflicts with the public's inter- 
est in free expression. The First Amendment protects both the 
right of the speaker to speak and that of her audience to 
hear.93 Courts and commentators have recognized that both of 
these First Amendment interests may be jeopardized by the 
right of publicity. To balance these competing interests they 
generally have adopted a broad commercialhon-commercial 
speech dichotomy. The unpermitted use of an  individual's iden- 
tity for news, information, or cultural purposes is constitution- 
ally immune from liability; the unpermitted use in advertising 
or on commercial products themselves triggers infringement of 
the right of Life, however, is not that simple. The 
line between protected and unprotected appropriation is diffi- 
92. The equation assumes that consumer demand is not perfectly inelastic or 
perfedly elastic. If the former were true, demand would not decrease as price rose. 
If consumer demand were perfectly elastic, higher costs would not equate to higher 
prices. There is, however, no reason to  believe that these assumptions are invalid. 
93. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-53 
(1976). 
94. See Benavidez v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1989); 
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publishing, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540, 1542 
(C.D. Cal. 1990), affd, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992); James v. Delilah Films, Inc., 
544 N.Y.S.2d 447, 451 (Sup. Ct. 1989); Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 
472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 262 (Sup. Ct. 1984), affd, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (App. Div. 1985); 
MCCARTHY, supra note 27, 5 7.1[A], at  7-2, 5 8.11[A], a t  8-82; Felcher & Rubin, su- 
pra note 28, at 1596; Hoffman, supra note 31, at 124. Immunity also extends to 
non-deceptive advertisements for products that are themselves subject to First 
Amendment protection. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 
11.14 (1983); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 462 (Cal. 1979) 
(Bird, C.J., concurring); MCCARTHY, supm note 27, 4 8.8[F][2], at  8-61 to 8-62. If a 
party is entitled to produce a film or book using the celebrity's name or likeness, 
it is equally entitled to advertise the work. 
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cult to draw with theoretical consistency. Consequently, some 
expression that should be immune from liability goes unpro- 
tected. The courts' uncertain standard also may chill expressive 
conduct unquestionably protected by the First Amendment. 
Moreover, in the absence of a convincing rationale for the right 
of publicity, even commercial speech should receive First 
Amendment protection. 
To illustrate the difficulty with a commerciaVnon-commer- 
cia1 dichotomy, consider a Leroy Neiman portrait of Michael 
Jordan. Artistic use of an  individual's persona is considered 
non-commercial and classically subject to full First Amendment 
protection. Should the same result obtain if Mr. Neiman sells 
100 limited edition posters of the Jordan portrait? One million 
posters? What if the portrait is silk-screened on T-shirts or 
other articles of clothing?95 
Some have suggested that the answer lies in the medium 
of exp res~ ion .~~  If the celebrity's identity is used in a tradi- 
tional medium for information or entertainment (e.g., books, 
newspapers, movies, artwork), First Amendment protection 
should preclude right of publicity liability. By contrast, use of a 
celebrity's persona in connection with "mere merchandise" 
should not receive First Amendment immunity. Under this 
standard, for example, the Jordan T-shirts would clearly be 
unprotected. 
However, the medium of expression test for commercial/ 
unprotected speech does not accurately represent current law. 
In fact, in the lone right of publicity case decided by the Su- 
preme Court, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 
First Amendment protection was denied even though plaintiffs 
identity was appropriated in a television news br~adcast . '~ 
Liability also has been found for imitation of a celebrity's per- 
sona in other media traditionally protected by the First Amend- 
ment. For example, in the "Beatlemania" case:' the defen- 
dants imitated the Beatles' appearance and singing style on 
stage, performing live twenty-nine Lemon-Mccartney songs. 
95. See Pesce, supra note 29, at 808. 
96. See MCCARTHY, supra note 27, $ 7.6[A], at 7-17 to 7-18; Hoffman, supra 
note 31, at 128 n.89, 140; Salomon, supra note 33, at 1203. 
97. 433 U.S. 562, 578-79 (1977). Admittedly, the Court in Zucchini emphasized 
that the defendant appropriated the plaintiff's entire performance and suggested 
that a lesser taking would have received First Amendment protection. Id. at 574- 
75. 
98. Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1015 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986). 
618 BRIGHAMYOUNGUNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [I992 
Although the individual members of the Beatles had not per- 
formed together in years, the court awarded plaintiffs over 7.5 
'million dollars in damages. Likewise, in Groucho Marx Produc- 
t i o n ~ , ~ ~  the defendants, producers and authors of the Broad- 
way musical-comedy A Day in Hollywood/A Night in the 
Ukraine were alleged to have infringed the Marx Brothers' 
right of publicity by presenting Chekhov's The Bear in the style 
of the Marx Brothers. Despite critical acclaim and the fact that 
the Marx Brothers were deceased, the lower court entered summa- 
ry judgment against the  defendants."' In  both the 
"Beatlemania" and Groucho Marx Productions cases, strong 
First Amendment arguments were dismissed.lO' Conversely, 
First Amendment protection has been extended to some uses in 
seemingly non-traditional modes of communication represent- 
ing limited free expression interests.lo2 
Even if the medium of expression standard for commercial 
speech accurately reflected existing law, significant First 
Amendment interests still might be compromised. For example, 
board games or computer software are not traditional media of 
expression, yet they can be educational as well as entertaining. 
Indeed, to encourage learning, effective teaching tools need to 
challenge and maintain interest. But the medium of expression 
standard effectively penalizes the creatodeducator for making a 
product too entertaining. Once such educational tools become 
entertainment, they are categorized as commercial speech and 
lose First Amendment protection. The medium of expression 
standard also does not eliminate difficult line drawing issues. 
For example, should statues commemorating deceased celebri- 
ties be considered art forms or crass commercialization?103 
99. Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982). 
100. The Second Circuit reversed on the grounds that California, not New York, 
law applied. In dicta, the court acknowledged that the defendants had a "substan- 
tial argument" that the play was First Amendment protected literary expression. 
689 F.2d a t  319 n.2. 
101. See also Marcinkus v. NAL Publishing Inc., 522 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (Sup. Ct. 
1987) (rehsing to dismiss complaint by Vatican official depicted in fictional work). 
102. See, e.g., Vinci v. American Can Co., 591 N.E.2d 793 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) 
(Olympic athletes on promotional cups); Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 
N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (poster of comedian running a mock campaign for the 
presidency of the United States). 
103. Cf Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980) (replicas of Elvis distributed by non-profit corporation 
to help finance erection of a large statue in downtown Memphis held unprotected 
by First Amendment); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. 
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Insofar as the line between commercial and noncommercial 
is ill-defined, the right of publicity threatens both types of 
speech. Because First Amendment protection must depend 
upon the proper exercise of a judge's or jury's discretion, ex- 
pression-restrictive outcomes, such as those in the Marcinkus, 
"Beatlemania" and Groucho Marx Productions cases, become 
possible. As a result, the unclear standard also may have a 
chilling effect on clearly protected expression. Rather than risk 
the costs of litigation, much less an improper or questionable 
judicial verdict, the putative defendant may forego any use of 
the celebrity's persona. For example, despite the public's fasci- 
nation with the Beatles, fear of a large damage award now will 
deter most producers from presenting a live anthology of Bea- 
tles songs without the consent of each individual group mem- 
ber. 
Furthermore, even if there were complete agreement con- 
cerning the definition of commercial speech, the right of public- 
ity still would interfere with many forms of creative expression. 
Commercial speech can no longer be dismissed as having no 
First Amendment value?" Successful advertisements often 
are more entertaining than the programs the advertisers spon- 
sor.'" Awards are given for the most creative advertisements 
and a collection of the winners sometimes is shown on televi- 
sion or in museums and movie houses. Advertisers contribute a 
part of themselves to many campaigns and in that sense may 
be thought to fulfill the First Amendment goal of self-actuahation.'06 
American Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982) (plastic bust of Martin 
Luther King, Jr .  unprotected by First Amendment). See also Kwall, supra note 28, 
at 242-43. 
104. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 US. 748 (1976). 
105. ~ u m o r ,  however, is not protected under the Fi rs t  Amendment when em- 
ployed solely in the advertisement or promotion of commercial products. See 
Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 263 (Sup. Ct. 1984), 
afd, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (App. Div. 1985); see also Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller 
Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying defendant summary judg- 
ment on copyright and publicity claims by "Fat Boys" rap group challenging Miller 
Beer commercial starring Joe Piscopo that broadly parodied the group). 
106. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concur- 
ring), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989): 
The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also 
those of the human spirit-a spirit that demands self-expression. Such 
expression is an integral part of the development of ideas and a sense of 
identity. To suppress expression is to reject the basic human desire for 
recognition and affront the individual's worth and dignity. 
See also Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 
620 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
The purchaser of commercial items may have an even 
greater First Amendment interest. A consumer's choice among 
the great variety of celebrity memorabilia is a statement about 
herself. It has emotive and communicative value.lo7 An Ice-T 
T-shirt may suggest dissatisfaction with authority; a poster 
with a red "X" through Madonna's picture may reflect a prefer- 
ence for sexual conservatism and definitely says that the pur- 
chaser does not like Madonna. 
Finally, when there is no likelihood of confusion as to 
source, advertisements and celebrity memorabilia frequently 
use the celebrity's persona in a communicative, as opposed to 
exploitive, manner.108 The associations with some celebrities 
evoke images that words cannot effectively match. For exam- 
ple, an advertisement for Excedrin might show John McEnroe 
berating an umpire, focus the camera on the umpire and cap- 
tion the ad "Excedrin headache number 102." Anyone familiar 
with tennis would immediately understand the message with- 
out the need to elaborate on the words spoken to the umpire. 
Such usage does not require the viewer to believe that McEn- 
roe endorses or is associated with the product. In this sense, it 
might be viewed as  analogous to the "fair use" defense in trade- 
mark law.lo9 
Some have suggested that the right of publicity does not 
conflict with any First Amendment interests because the plain- 
tiff does not wish to prevent speech, but merely be paid for the 
use of his or her identity."' That argument is disingenuous. 
Many plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, not merely damages. 
Some refuse to permit commercial use of their persona at any 
price. This is particularly true when the putative defendant 
seeks to use the celebrity's identity for parody or otherwise 
present the celebrity's persona in an unflattering light. Some- 
times complications such as  transaction costs or strategic bar- 
gaining will prevent expressive uses of a celebrity's persona. 
The risk of such complications is especially great when the use 
YALE L.J. 877, 879 (1963). 
107. See Andrew B. Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability Reconsidered, 49 
FORDHAM L. REVIEW 453, 494-95 (1981). 
108. If there is codusion of source, the celebrity has an action under state un- 
fair competition laws or the federal Lanham Act. See supra note 7. 
109. Cf Lanham Act, 5 3303), 15 U.S.C. 3 111503) (1988). 
110. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 
(1977); Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904, 913 (D.N.J. 1986); Mc- 
CAWTHY, supra note 27, 5 7.1[B], at 7-3. 
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requires the authorization of more than one individual. For 
example, although John Lemon's estate, Ringo Starr, and 
George Harrison may authorize a show such as "Beatlemania," 
Paul McCartney's refusal may prevent its production. Finally, 
as a matter of simple economics, if license fees are required 
and costs increase, the supply of some commercial speech will 
be eliminated."' Unprofitability will deter production of some 
celebrity memorabilia and concomitantly restrict consumers' 
forms of expression. In these ways (and no doubt others) the 
right of publicity conflicts with First Amendment interests. 
There is no question that commercial speech is not entitled 
to the same degree of First Amendment protection as political 
speech. This article does no't suggest anything to the contrary. 
Rather, it contends that the commercial use of a celebrity's per- 
sona has some First Amendment value. While that value may 
be comparatively slight, unless there is a substantial competing 
government interest, that value should not be dismissed. In 
part 111, I have argued that there is no such government inter- 
est supporting the right of publicity. Accordingly, the expres- 
sive component of commercial speech should be enough to re- 
ject a right of publicity for non-confusing uses of a celebrity's 
persona.ll2 The possibility that some courts will find non- 
commercial speech actionable and that an  uncertain standard 
will chill all speech only strengthens this conclusion. 
C. Conflict Between the Right of Publicity and 
Copyright Policies 
The right of publicity sometimes conflicts with federal 
copyright objectives. Specifically, the right of publicity may (1) 
prevent free access to matters that Congress intended to be in  
the public domain113 or (2) interfere with the untrammeled 
111. Of course, increased costs that deter speech are why defamation actions 
seeking damages implicate First Amendment ,rights. See New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
112. Confusing commercial uses of a celebrity's persona are actionable under 
state unfair competition laws and the Lanham Act and do not raise First 
Amendment issues. Misleading commercial speech is not protected speech within 
the First Amendment. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 447 US. 557 (1980). 
113. For example, the majority of states recognize a postmortem right of public- 
ity. Thus, it is possible that after the copyright on a film expires, the public will 
still be precluded from freely using the copyrighted work. See Shipley, supra note 
30, at 724-25; see also Pesce, supra note 29, at 819 ("A state right of publicity that 
prohibits vocal imitation is inconsistent with Congressional intent* to preclude 
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exercise of the rights accorded the copyright owner or his li- 
censee.l14 Although some such conflicts will result in federal 
preemption, often the celebrity's right of publicity will be en- 
forced a t  the expense of copyright interests. 
Section 301 of the Copyright Act provides specific statutory 
authority for federal preemption. That section provides that 
any state law is subject to federal preemption if the state law 
reproduction, but not imitation, of copyrighted sound recordings.). 
114. See Hoffman, supra note 31, at 130. Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for 
Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982) 
illustrates one potential conflict. In Martin Luther King, Jr., the defendant market- 
ed a plastic bust of the deceased civil rights leader. The original sculpture could be 
copyrighted, see 17 U.S.C. $ 102(a)(5) (1988), and did not infringe the King estate's 
right of publicity because it was protected by the First Amendment. See supra note 
94 and accompanying text. The Georgia Supreme Court, however, found the right 
of publicity violated by the reproduction and commercial distribution of the busts. 
This result severely restricted the exclusive rights guaranteed under section 106 of 
the Copyright Act to every author. See 17 U.S.C. $ 106 (1988 & Supp. I1 1990). By 
limiting the potential revenues available to sculptors, the court effectively restruc- 
tured the incentives for creativity provided by Congress. 
The ability to exploit one's copyright also may be threatened by the effect the 
right of publicity has on the liability exposure of licensees. For example, a licensee 
that has paid for the use of copyrighted material for advertising purposes may face 
liability to celebrities who are associated with the copyrighted work. Such was the 
situation in Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); cf. Fadors, 
Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 
(1979) (defendant enjoined from selling copies of copyrighted photograph); Sinatra 
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 
U.S. 906 (1971) (liability denied, but litigation expenses incurred by defendant that 
used the copyrighted song "These Boots Are Made for Walkin" as part of its adver- 
tising campaign). In Midler, the defendants used a Midler sound-a-like to perform 
the song "Do You Want to Dance" as part of an automobile advertisement. Al- 
though they paid the copyright holder for use of the song, they did not make any 
payment to Midler. The defendants were found to have violated Ms. Midler's right 
of publicity and damages were assessed. 849 F.2d at 463. In Midler, there was 
evidence that the defendants deliberately attempted to evoke Ms. Midler's image. 
The defendants first requested Ms. Midler to participate in the advertisement, and 
when she refused, they instructed the singer they hired to 'sound as  much as 
possible like the Bette Midler record." Id. a t  461. In such cases the conflict with 
copyright is minimal. Nevertheless, an i ~ o c e n t  copyright licensee similarly may 
face liability exposure, or at least litigation expenses, if a disgruntled celebrity 
erroneously concludes that the use of a song strongly identifed with him or her 
was designed to suggest the celebrity's participation or endorsement. Rather than 
attempting to anticipate all potential lawsuits and negotiating rights fees, see Da- 
vid E. Shipley, Three Strikes and They're Out a t  the Old Ball Game: Preemption of 
Performers' Rights of Publicity Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 20 ARB. ST. L.J. 
369, 419-20 (1988); MCCARTHY, supra note 27, $ 11.14[C], a t  11-81, the advertiser 
simply may choose to forego use of the copyrighted work. See Sinatra, 435 F.2d a t  
718. Admittedly, this latter conflict with copyright policy might be avoided if the 
copyright holder initially contracts with the performer for all publicity rights. Not 
all copyright holders, however, will be able to  reach agreement with all subjects of 
and participants in the copyrighted works. 
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grants rights "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within 
the general scope of copyright" in "works of authorship that are 
fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the 
subject matter of copyright."l15 
Section 301, however, does not adequately protect federal 
copyright policies from interference by a state-recognized right 
of publicity. Many courts have held that the intangible propri- 
etary interest protected by the right of publicity is not a writ- 
ing? Although the transitory image or sound of the celebri- 
ty may be fixed in a photograph or recording, the persona or 
publicity values generated by the celebrity are not."' Copy- 
right law protects the expression of ideas, not the ideas them- 
selves.l18 The celebrity's name or likeness, however, falls on 
the idea side of the idedexpression dichotomy and therefore 
should not come within the subject matter of copyright.llg 
Statutory preemption is supplemented by constitutional 
preemption. Under the Supremacy Clause,12o state law is pre- 
empted whenever it stands as an  obstacle to the objectives of 
federal law.l2l When the right of publicity prevents a copy- 
right holder from freely licensing or distributing her work, the 
incentive to create, the central policy of the Copyright Act,lp 
115. 17 U.S.C. $ 301(a) (1988). 
116. See, e.g., Midler, 849 F.2d at  462; Bi-Rite Enters. v. Button Master, 555 F. 
Supp. 1188, 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 448 
(Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). But see Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League 
Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 677-78 n.26 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 
U.S. 941 (1987). 
117. See MCCARTHY, supra note 27, $ 11.13[C][4], at  11-78; Paul Heald, Federal 
Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959, 
995 (1991); Shipley, supra note 114, at 415-16. 
118. See 17 U.S.C. $ 102(b) (1988). 
119. See 17 U.S.C. $ 102 (1988 & Supp. I1 1990); see also Shipley, supra note 
30, at 733. 
120. "The Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in 
every state shall be bound thereby." US. CONST. art. VI. 
121. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941). It may seem anomalous 
to presume congressional intent to preempt state law when specific statutory pre- 
emption provisions are unavailable. Nevertheless, given $ 301's draRing limitations, 
preemption clearly may be appropriate even when $ 301 does not apply. For exam- 
ple, it is axiomatic that copyright does not protect ideas. See 17 U.S.C. $ 102(b) 
(1988). The public interest is thought to be fbrthered by free access to ideas. Yet, 
because ideas are not the subject matter of copyright, a state law that extended 
copyright-like protection to ideas would not be preempted under a literal reading of 
$ 301. That result is untenable. See Pesce, supra note 29, a t  812. 
122. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 US.  151, 156 
(1975). 
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is diminished. 
Nevertheless, constitutional preemption also does not fully 
protect copyright interests. Despite the apparent conflict be- 
tween the right of publicity and copyright policies, constitution- 
al preemption may be unavailable. The rights granted by copy- 
right do not include an unqualified guarantee of maximum 
commercial opportunity. Many bodies of law limit the value of 
the copyright-holder's parcel of rights. For example, states may 
validly prohibit "blind bidding"lB of copyrighted motion pic- 
tures even though the effect of such laws is to reduce the copy- 
right holder's revenues? Similarly, a federal court has up- 
held the California Resale Royalties Act's limitation on the 
right to dispose of copyrighted art works.125 What constitutes 
sufficient interference with the copyright holder's rights to 
mandate preemption ultimately is -a matter of line drawing 
that requires a balancing of interests. However, it is not neces- 
sary for this article to engage in such balancing.lZ6 Rather, i t  
is enough to recognize that there have been and will continue 
to be some cases in which federal interests are compromised, 
but preemption is rejected.12' 
Admittedly, the frequency and severity of non-preempted 
conflict with copyright policy may not demand immediate ac- 
tion. Nevertheless, the interference with copyright interests, 
when combined with free market and First Amendment inter- 
ests,'% makes recognition of a right of publicity singularly un- 
appealing. lZg 
123. "Blind bidding" is the practice of licensing a motion picture to an exhibitor 
without the exhibitor first viewing the fdm. 
124. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp.. 408 (S.D. Ohio 
1980), affd in part & rev'd in part, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982). 
125. See Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 
(1980). 
126. Given this article's view that the right of publicity has no persuasive justifi- 
cation, I would recommend preemption if copyright interests are infringed even to 
a de minimis extent. This, however, is not the law. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor 
Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 
215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 
603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). Courts operate under the implicit 
assumption that the right of publicity protects valid state interests. Given this as- 
sumption, minimal interference with federal interests c a ~ o t  justify preemption. 
127. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
128. See supra notes 86-112 and accompanying text. 
129. Moreover, if states did not recognize a right of publicity, not only would the 
interference with copyright interests be eliminated, but litigation over preemption 
issues would be drastically reduced. Without a right of publicity, many celebrities 
whose name or likeness is appropriated will bring state unfair competition or fed- 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The right of publicity originated a t  a time when many 
entertainers were poorly compensated for their creative endeav- 
ors. The ballplayers in ~ a e l a n ' ~ ~  received salaries that  were 
a minuscule fraction of what similar athletes currently earn. In  
that milieu, fairness concerns and a desire to maintain incen- 
tives for creativity might easily have justified a right of publici- 
ty. The facts have changed. It now seems that  recognition of 
the right of publicity is driven by fear: fear that a celebrity's 
name or likeness will be plastered everywhere; fear of Me1 
Gibson toilet bowl cleaners and Whitney Houston toothpastes; 
and fear that celebrities forced to endure such uncompensated 
indignities might react by withdrawing from the public spot- 
light. 
Part  IV of this article challenged these fears.13' Rejection 
of a right of publicity, as recommended by this article, would 
not result in complete and open access to every celebrity's per- 
sona. The Lanham Act and state unfair competition laws still 
would stand as obstacles to such unbridled  appropriation^.'^^ 
For example, the result in a case such as Midler would be the 
same even without a right of publicity. By evoking Midler's 
eral Lanham Act claims. Those claims, however, would not raise preemption issues. 
Unfair competition and Lanham Act claims require a demonstration of likelihood of 
confusion. The requirement of that extra element is enough to distinguish those 
rights from the exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act. See, e.g., Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on 
other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); MCCARTHY, supra note 27, $ 11.13[A][21, a t  
11-65. Given an absence of "equivalent rights," statutory preemption clearly would 
fail. Section 301 also specifically disavows any intent to preempt other federal 
statutes. 17 U.S.C. 8 301(d) (1988). Of course, the federal Lanham Act also would 
not be subject to constitutional preemption. Furthermore, a celebrity could not cred- 
ibly suggest that Congress intended to protect deceptive uses of a celebrity's perso- 
na from state regulation. See Pesce, supra note 29, a t  820-21. 
130. Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 346 US. 816 (1953). 
131. See supra notes 85-129 and accompanying text. 
132. Theoretically, advertisers might make unlimited use of a celebrity's name or 
likeness if such use was accompanied by a clear and conspicuous disclaimer of 
association or endorsement. Whether a disclaimer was suffkiently clear and promi- 
nent, however, would be a fad  question. Given evidence that disclaimers generally 
are not effective, see, e.g., Brockum Co. v. Blaylock, 729 F. Supp. 438, 443, 445 
(E.D. Pa. 1990); Jacob Jacoby & Robert Lloyd Raskopf, Disclaimers in Trademark 
Infringement Litigation: More Trouble Than They Are Worth?, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 
35, 44, 49-58 (1986), many defendants would be reluctant to rely on disclaimers to 
avoid damage liability. Moreover, the clearer the disclaimer, the less valuable the 
appropriation of the celebrity's identity. 
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identity and confusingly suggesting that Ms. Midler endorsed 
or was associated with Ford Motor Company's product, the 
defendants could be found to have violated section 43 of the 
Lanham 
Similarly, there is little validity to the concern that celebri- 
ties will forego creativity rather than be subject to uncompen- 
sated embarrassments. Without a right of publicity, not only 
will celebrities often receive outlandish revenues from the ac- 
tivities that brought them fame, but they also will continue to 
receive endorsement income and money to act as  the sponsor 
for "official" goods. Furthermore, the embarrassment from the 
unauthorized, but non-confusing, commercial use of a 
celebrity's identity pales in comparison to the possible effects of 
virtually unrestricted media coverage of the celebrity's public 
and private 1 i ~ e s . l ~ ~  If that coverage does not deter creativity, 
there is little reason to anticipate such effects from a reduction 
in collateral revenues. 
By the same token, the protection provided by the Lanham 
Act and state unfair competition law places a limit on the ad- 
vantages to be gained from a rejection of the right of publicity. 
Not all license fees would be reduced and not all potential First 
Amendment infringements and copyright conflicts would be 
eliminated. Although the benefits from this article's proposal 
may be modest, they are nonetheless real. Specifically, rejection 
of the right of publicity would improve access to celebrities' 
names or likenesses in those situations where confusion or 
misrepresentation could be avoided. Thus, where parties pro- 
vide bold and explicit disclaimers, competition would increase 
and the premium now paid by consumers for monopoly goods 
would be reduced? Use of celebrities' persona in contexts 
where reasonable people would not assume celebrity endorse- 
ment or participation also would improve competition or pro- 
vide new products. For example, USA Basketball likely would 
be able to distribute group shots of the Olympic team if they 
prominently displayed the USA Basketball logo. Under such 
circumstances, it probably would be unreasonable for the con- 
sumer to conclude that each player endorsed or participated in 
133. The plaintiff in Midler, however, originally did not bring a Lanham Act 
claim and the district court denied the plaintiffs motion to amend her complaint to 
remedy that oversight. Appellant's Opening Brief at 44-47, Midler v. Ford Motor 
Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-6168). 
134. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. 
135. But see supra note 132. 
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the manufacture of such products.ls6 
The public would also be able to enjoy the freer use of 
parody in both commercial and non-commercial settings. Paro- 
dy, by its very nature, is done by persons other than the indi- 
viduals parodied. Similarly, use of a celebrity's name in works 
of fiction would be protected. Finally, imitation of deceased 
celebrities would not be actionable.13' Under these principles, 
cases such as "Beatlem~nia,"'~ Groucho Marx Produc- 
tions, lsg Marcinkus,'" Miller Brewing,"' and Estate of 
P r e ~ l e y l ~ ~  probably would be decided differently. The obvious 
result would be greater protection for First Amendment inter- 
ests. 
Rejection of a right of publicity also would yield several 
peripheral benefits. Litigation costs would be reduced by elimi- 
nating difficult First Amendment and preemption issues.'43 
Some cases even may not be brought? Elimination of the 
right of publicity also-may provide trademark type benefits. If 
use of a celebrity's likeness is actionable whether or not the 
knockoff artist disclaims any association with the celebrity, as 
136. If the right of publicity were rejected, over time it would become increasing- 
ly unreasonable to assume celebrity authorization or endorsement. Now, individuals 
may assume celebrity participation based upon knowledge of the existing law. That 
is, they may recognize that unauthorized use of the celebrity's identity is action- 
able and therefore conclude that the celebrity must have authorized use of his or 
her persona. See Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 1989). 
137. Not only is imitation of a deceased performer unlikely to create confusion, 
but an estate plaintiffs asserted interests are weaker. The celebrity's estate does 
not have a personal autonomy interest and c a ~ o t  claim that the defendant's re- 
turns represent the fruits of the plaintiffs labors. Lastly, returns after death prob- 
ably are not needed to create incentives for an artist while she is living. 
138. Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1015 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986). 
139. Groucho Mam Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981), reu'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982). 
140. Marcinkus v. NAL Publishing Inc., 522 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (work 
of fiction naming Vatican official). 
141. Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990) ("Fat Boys" parody). 
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143. See supra notes 93-127 and accompanying text. 
144. Unfortunately, most actions asserting a right of publicity contain several 
counts. Many complaints will allege a Lanham Act violation, invasion of privacy, 
defamation, copyright infringement or misappropriation in addition to the publicity 
claim. Thus, although some cases may be avoided, cf. Neil L. Shapiro & Karl 
Olson, Encore Performances: "Do You Want to Sue?" Climbs the Charts, LEGAL 
TIMES, Jan. 15, 1990, at 27 (Midler's broad right of publicity decision spawned cas- 
es that otherwise might not have been brought), realistically, the majority of cases 
still will be filed. Nevertheless, the cases should raise fewer issues. 
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is the case under current law, there is an  incentive to confuse 
the public about the knockoff product's origin. By passing off 
the goods as those of the celebrity's, the appropriator can cur- 
rently garner greater returns. However, by permitting and 
protecting "knockoffs" that clearly and conspicuously label 
themselves as such, the law would indirectly protect consumers 
from misrepresentation and help foster a greater market for 
knockoff goods. 145 
The most efficient and effective way to adopt this article's 
proposal would be federal legislation. A federal provision pre- 
empting state right of publicity laws would create nationwide 
uniformity. It would provide predictability to national advertis- 
ers and publishers and would eliminate difficult conflict of law 
issues.'" Unfortunately, there does not appear to be any 
ground swell of support for such legislation. Similarly, i t  is 
unlikely that state legislators will repeal statutes or override 
judicial decisions recognizing the right of publicity. Thus, as  a 
practical matter, the implications of this article's analysis are 
primarily two-fold. First, policy makers in states that have yet 
to adopt a right of publicity should refuse to do so. Second, 
courts in states that have adopted the right should construe its 
boundaries narrowly. In particular, a postmortem right of pub- 
licity should be rejected and First Amendment protection 
should be defined broadly. The right of publicity has intuitive 
appeal. But when one looks behind the rhetoric, there is little 
to support its widespread recognition and much that recom- 
mends its rejection. 
145. Some knockoff artists would still try to market their goods as "official" 
goods because "official* goods would demand a higher price. Nevertheless, the pre- 
mium for "official* goods would be reduced under this article's proposal and hence 
the incentive for misrepresentation would decrease. 
146. See MCCARTHY, supra note 27, at 11-14 to 11-19; Salomon, supra note 33, 
at 1180-85. 
